Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification Rae Langton Abstract This book collects together fifteen chapters on pornography and objectification. Arguments from uncontroversial liberal premises are shown to yield controversial feminist conclusions that pornography of a certain kind subordinates and silences women, and that women have rights against it. The arguments draw on speech act theory and pragmatics to show how such pornography may be speech that subordinates and silences.
References and Further Reading 1. The Importance of the Problem No great philosopher has espoused solipsism. As a theory, if indeed it can be termed such, it is clearly very far removed from common sense. In view of this, it might reasonably be asked why the problem of solipsism should receive any philosophical attention.
There are two answers to this question. First, while no great philosopher has explicitly espoused solipsism, this can be attributed to the inconsistency of much philosophical reasoning. Many philosophers have failed to accept the logical consequences of their own most fundamental commitments and preconceptions.
The foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual gets his own psychological concepts thinking, willing, perceiving, and so forth.
In this sense, solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes and any theory of knowledge that adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of reference is inherently solipsistic. Second, solipsism merits close examination because it is based upon three widely entertained philosophical presuppositions, which are themselves of fundamental and wide-ranging importance.
For example, there is no necessary link between the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a body of a particular kind; and c The experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person.
These presuppositions are of unmistakable Cartesian origin, and are widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In tackling the problem of solipsism, one immediately grapples with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind.
However spurious the problem of solipsism per se may strike one, these latter issues are unquestionably important. Indeed, one of the merits of the entire enterprise is the extent that it reveals a direct connection between apparently unexceptionable and certainly widely-held common sense beliefs and the acceptance of solipsistic conclusions.
If this connection exists and we wish to avoid those solipsistic conclusions, we shall have no option but to revise, or at least to critically review, the beliefs from which they derive logical sustenance. For the ego that is revealed by the cogito is a solitary consciousness, a res cogitans that is not spatially extended, is not necessarily located in any body, and can be assured of its own existence exclusively as a conscious mind.
Discourse on Method and the Meditations. This view of the self is intrinsically solipsistic and Descartes evades the solipsistic consequences of his method of doubt by the desperate expedient of appealing to the benevolence of God.
Since God is no deceiver, he argues, and since He has created man with an innate disposition to assume the existence of an external, public world corresponding to the private world of the "ideas" that are the only immediate objects of consciousness, it follows that such a public world actually exists.
Thus does God bridge the chasm between the solitary consciousness revealed by methodic doubt and the intersubjective world of public objects and other human beings? A modern philosopher cannot evade solipsism under the Cartesian picture of consciousness without accepting the function attributed to God by Descartes something few modern philosophers are willing to do.
Although this view utilizes language and employs conceptual categories "the individual," "other minds," and so forth. On this view, what I know immediately and with greatest certainty are the events that occur in my own mind - my thoughts, my emotions, my perceptions, my desires, and so forth.
By the same token, it follows that I do not know other minds in the way that I know my own; indeed, if I am to be said to know other minds at all - that they exist and have a particular nature - it can only be on the basis of certain inferences that I have made from what is directly accessible to me, the behavior of other human beings.
The essentials of the Cartesian view were accepted by John Lockethe father of modern British empiricism. Without exception, such concepts have their genesis in the experience of the corresponding mental processes.
If I acquire my psychological concepts by introspecting upon my own mental operations, then it follows that I do so independently of my knowledge of my bodily states. Any correlation that I make between the two will be effected subsequent to my acquisition of my psychological concepts. Thus, the correlation between bodily and mental stated is not a logically necessary one.
I may discover, for example, that whenever I feel pain my body is injured in some way, but I can discover this factual correlation only after I have acquired the concept "pain. The Argument from Analogy What then of my knowledge of the minds of others?
This is the so-called "argument from analogy" for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. Observing that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances, I can infer that the mental life and series of mental events that accompany my bodily behavior are also present in the case of others.
Thus, for example, when I see a problem that I am trying unsuccessfully to solve, I feel myself becoming frustrated and observe myself acting in a particular way. In the case of another, I observe only the first and last terms of this three-term sequence and, on this basis, I infer that the "hidden" middle term, the feeling of frustration, has also occurred.Essay about Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Solipsism - Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Solipsism In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant set out to establish a theory of human understanding.
His approach was to synthesise the opposing views of empiricism and rationalism. This book collects together fifteen chapters on pornography and objectification. Arguments from uncontroversial liberal premises are shown to yield controversial feminist conclusions that pornography of a certain kind subordinates and silences women, and that women have rights against it.
An Analysis of Solipsism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Essay Words | 9 Pages. Analysis of Solipsism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason My goal is to examine solipsism and discover how Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism could be subject to a charge of being solipsistic.
Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds. (Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.i.4ff). If I acquire my psychological concepts by introspecting upon my own mental operations, then it follows that I do so independently of my knowledge of my bodily states.
Any correlation that I make between the two will be effected subsequent to my. Essay on Critical Analysis of Dualism, Monism, and Solipsism November 12, Intro to Philosophy Critical Analysis of Dualism, Monism, and Solipsism In this report I will give my critical analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and clarity of dualism, monism, and solipsism.
An Analysis of Solipsism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Essay Words | 9 Pages Analysis of Solipsism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason My goal is to examine solipsism and discover how Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism could be subject to a charge of being solipsistic.